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I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, some scholars, reformers, and elected officials have advocated for
a federal right to education.' But in light of the Supreme Court's recent rulings,
including its decisions invalidating race-conscious school integration plans2 and
deferring to agency officials on matters of school funding,3 the federal courts do not
appear to be the best forum for securing every student a quality education. Instead,
advocates should seek reform from state courts, which have been more receptive
to recognizing a right to education, as such a strategy avoids the legal and political
pitfalls of making a federal case out of education.4
In Brown v. Board of Education5 (Brown 1), the Supreme Court famously
declared that education, "where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms."6 Ever since, there have been
fierce debates regarding the best means to fulfill Brown I's promise that all children
must have an equal opportunity to learn. Proponents have alternatively argued for
1. See, e.g., Student Bill of Rights Act, S. 2189, 110th Cong. §§ 102, 401 (2007) (providing for
adequate and equitable educational opportunities for public school students and the right to bring civil
actions in federal court if a state fails to provide sufficient resources or comply with state school finance
decisions); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND
WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 13, 234 (2004) (noting the inclusion and importance of"the right
to a good education" in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights); Susan H. Bitensky,
Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End
of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550, 574 (1992) (arguing that the Constitution
contains several provisions that can support an "implied positive right to education"); Julius Chambers,
Adequate Education for All: A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 55, 69 72
(1987) (positing that the Equal Protection Clause forms the basis for recognizing a fundamental right
to education); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 111,
123 (2004) (concluding that federal courts have been "tragically wrong" in failing to find a
constitutional right to education); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citienship, 116
YALE L.J. 330, 334 (2006) (arguing that the federal government has a constitutional duty to ensure that
every child has the opportunity to receive an education); Penelope A. Preovolos, Rodriguez Revisited:
Federalism, Meaning/ul Access, and the Right to Adequate Education, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 75,
75-76 (1980) (arguing that the recognition of a fundamental right to education is not inconsistent with
notions of federalism); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model
for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1712-16 (2007) (urging Congress to
recognize a federal right to education and enact it through spending legislation); Note, A Right to
Learn?: Improving Educational Outcomes Through Substantive Due Process, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1323,
1341-44 (2007) (arguing that substantive due process provides a means for recognizing education as
a fundamental right); Michael Salerno, Note, Reading Is Fundamental: Why the No Child Left Behind
Act Necessitates Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Education, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICS J. 509, 538-40 (2007) (arguing that by federalizing components of public education, the No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act requires the recognition of education as a fundamental right).
2. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746 (2007).
3. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't ofEduc., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1543 (2007).
4. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. Id. at 493.
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class integration or greater resources,7 urged federal intervention,8 or promoted
state-level strategies. 9
No matter which school ofthought is embraced, scholars must squarely address
the two Supreme Court decisions that have most influenced the debate about Brown
I's legacy and the fight for quality education: San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez"0 and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1.1 The former, in which the Court upheld disparities in school
funding, 2 has been widely viewed as closing the door on a federal constitutional
right to education. 3 The latter, in which the Court struck down the use of race in
local efforts to integrate schools, 4 suggests that this country is entering the end of
the desegregation era.15
What then is the next step in the movement to ensure a quality education for
all children? At an April 2006 conference at the University of California at
Berkeley law school, scholars explored various aspects of pursuing education as a
fundamental right.' 6 At a November 2007 symposium at Columbia University, legal
reformers reassessed recent federal efforts at school integration and state school
funding litigation. 7 Scholars appraising these developments have predicted that
advocates might begin using the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act 8 and
7. See Tamar Lewin & David M. Herszenhorn, Money, Not Race, Is Fueling New Push to Bolster
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A10.
8. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 153 (noting that the Supreme Court, as constituted prior to
President Nixon's appointments, continuously required the federal government to provide adequate
opportunities for the nation's poor).
9. See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1526-29 (2007) (advocating the use of state courts and
identifying numerous successful challenges to inadequate educational funding in state court
proceedings).
10. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
11. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
12. Rodriguei, 411 U.S. at 36 37.
13. See PETER SCHRAG, FINAL TEST: THE BATTLE FOR ADEQUACY IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 76 77
(2003); Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy, and the Courts, in ACHIEVING HIGH
EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL 218, 219-26 (Timothy Ready et al. eds., 2002).
14. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746.
15. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Desegregation's Demise, CHRON. HIGHEREDUC. (Wash., D.C.), July
13, 2007, at B8 ("[1]t is time to acknowledge that racial integration as the primary vehicle for providing
effective schooling for black and Latino children has run its course."); All Things Considered: Court
Ruling Ends Era of SchoolDesegregation (National Public Radio broadcast June 30, 2007), available
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld- 11630592 (follow "Listen Now" hyperlink)
(noting that the Parents Involved decision marked the end of a fifty-year era of state-implemented
desegregation plans since Brown I).
16. For a collection of the research abstracts of the conference participants, see CHIEF JUSTICE
EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, RETHINKING RODRIRuEZ: EDUCATION AS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT (2006), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/ewi-old/research/kl2equity/
rodriguez abstracts.pdf
17. For an overview of the symposium, see The Campaign for Educational Equity: Symposium,
Fall 2007: Equal Educational Opportunity: What Now? Reassessing the Role of the Courts, the Law and
School Policies After Seattle and CFE (Nov. 12-13, 2007), http://www.tc.columbia.edu/centers/
EquitySymposium/symposium07/symposium.asp.
18. Joshua Dunn & Martha Derthick, Adequacy Litigation and the Separation of Powers, in
SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 322, 341 (Martin R. West
& Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (suggesting that amendments to NCLB could provide access to federal
courts for those parties that routinely lose in state courts).
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successful state school funding decisions' 9 to "secure a foundation in federal law"
for a right to education."
This Article addresses these issues in two ways. First, Part 1II of this Article
aims to correct a deep misunderstanding about Rodriguez, even among experts, by
demonstrating that the Court's decision and subsequent legal and political
developments make a federal constitutional right to an education viable. Unlike
recent proponents, however, Part IV of this Article urges advocates not to pursue
a federal right to education at this time. Because state-level school funding
litigation has been successful, and the federal judiciary has withdrawn from the
education arena, and the Supreme Court has placed renewed emphasis on
federalism, now is not the time to make a federal case out of education. Instead,
advocates should work with state courts, legislators, and interested citizens, as they
have for the last several decades, to ensure that public schools receive funding
based on student need. To reach these conclusions, Part I1 of this Article documents
the inequities in school funding, their costs, and efforts in the last fifty years to
remedy the problems in state and federal court.
1I. ORIGINS OF A RIGHT TO EDUCATION
A. Unequal Funding for Public Schools
According to the most recent data, close to 49 million students-one in six
Americans are enrolled in public schools."' America's schools are funded almost
entirely by state and local taxes,zz predominantly property taxes, which are products
of local wealth.23 Under this funding scheme, property-rich districts can tax
themselves at lower rates and still produce more revenue than property-poor
districts.2 4 This decentralized system provides students with significantly different
educational opportunities based on where they live, creating "some of the best- and
worst-financed schools in the developed world.""z Federal, state, and local funding
exacerbates these inequities through perverse formulas that provide the neediest
states, school districts, and local schools fewer dollars per student.2 6
19. Andrew Rudalevige, Adequacy, Accountability, and the Impact of the No Child Left Behind
Act, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, Supra note 18, at
243, 255 (recognizing the recent rise of national school funding institutes that disseminate information
about state suits at universities such as Columbia and UC Berkeley).
20. Dunn & Derthick, supra note 18.
21. See NAT'L CTR. FOREDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2004-05 (FISCAL YEAR 2005),
at 8 tbl.3 (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS (Apr. 2007)], available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007356.pdf
22. See AUSTIN D. SWANSON & RICHARD A. KING, SCHOOL FINANCE: ITS ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS 11 tbl.1 (2d ed. 1997).
23. Id. at 130.
24. See id. at 152 53.
25. Id. at 482.
26. THE EDUC. TRUST, FUNDING GAPS 2006, at 1 (2006), http://w 2v.edtrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/
CDEF9403-5A75-437E-93FF-EBF 117418 1IFB/0/FundingGap2006.pdf
[Vol. 59: 755
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The result of this unequal investment is a shortage of quality teaching,
textbooks, and facilities in many of our nation's schools.27 Schools in some states
operate with significantly fewer resources, as per pupil spending ranges from
$5,216 in Utah to $14,117 in New Jersey. 28 Within every state, there are equally
significant disparities: in twenty states, the highest spending 5% of school districts
expend more than twice as many dollars per student than the lowest spending 5%.29
In Montana, for example, the most highly-funded schools spent $22,242 per
student, while the poorest schools only spent $5,714.3o When expanded to the
classroom and school levels, funding gaps of thousands of dollars per student3' can
amount to overall disparities of hundreds of thousands of dollars per classroom or
millions of dollars per school.
In addition to local inequities, states often allocate funding to schools based on
political motivations rather than actual student need. 2 As a result, according to a
recent study, poor districts with the most at-risk children are provided with fewer
resources, with high-poverty districts, on average, spending $907 less per student
than low-poverty districts.33 For example, according to a recent study, $12,896 is
spent per pupil in New York City, one of the state's most impoverished school
districts, while $23,344 is spent per pupil educating students in one of the state's
low-poverty suburbs. 4 Regardless of these and similar disparities, most public
schools have less than $7.44 to spend per hour to educate a single child.35 Even in
the highest-spending state, only $12.07 per hour is invested, on average, to prepare
a student for the workforce and productive citizenship. 6
27. See SCHRAG, supra note 13, at 6-7. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES:
CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991) (describing the understaffed and overcrowded schools
serving poor and minority students); JONATHANKOZOL, THE SHAME OF THENATION: THERESTORATION
OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (2005) (describing the extreme condition of various schools
across the country lacking basic resources).
28. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS (Apr. 2007), supra note 21. According to the latest data,
median spending per elementary and secondary school student in this country is $8,70 1. Id. at 2, 8 tbl.3.
29. See NAT'L CTR. FOREDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS: SCHOOL YEAR 2004-05 (FISCAL YEAR
2005), at 7 tbl.3 (June 2007) [hereinafter NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS (June 2007)], available
at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007355.pdf
30. Id.
31. Cf THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., FUND THE CHILD: TACKLING INEQUITY AND ANTIQUITY IN
SCHOOL FINANCE 2 (2006), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/fundthechild/FundtheChild
062706.pdf (noting that funding disparities can amount to thousands of dollars less per year spent on
students).
32. Rebell, supra note 9, at 1523.
33. Id. at 1476.
34. Id. at 1477.
35. This calculation is based on an average per student spending of $8,701, NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS (Apr. 2007), supra note 21, a 180-day school year, and a 6.5-hour school day, see
Nancy Zuckerbrod & Melissa Trujillo, Length of School Day Under Review, MOBILE REG., Feb. 25,
2007, at A5 (noting that on average students spend 6.5 hours per day and 180 days per year in school).
See generally Number of Instructional Days/Hours in the School Year, STATENOTES (Educ. Comm'n
of the States, Denver, Colo.), July 2004, http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/55/26/5526.doc (listing the
differences in the length of the school year in various states).
36. Per pupil expenditure in the highest-spending state, New Jersey, was $14,117 in 2005. NAT'L
CTR. FOREDUC. STATISTICS (Apr. 2007), supra note 21. When divided by 1,170 hours (180 days per
year multiplied by 6.5 hours per day spent in school), the average amount spent per hour on each
student equals $12.07.
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The results of this underinvestment are well documented in lawsuits from over
forty states challenging state methods of funding public schools.37 Students in some
of the poorest districts in Alabama were forced to use outhouses, while some of
their counterparts in New York who were required to pass a lab-science exam to
graduate had to attend schools without functioning labs. 8 Rural South Carolina
schools, built as long ago as 1896, must contend with ancient plumbing that leaks
raw sewage into classrooms and libraries stocked with books professing that "one
day man will land on the moon."' 9 And in one Arkansas school district, not a single
student was prepared for college at graduation.4" In short, these resource shortages
prevent educators from providing appropriate teachers, curricula, facilities,
technology, libraries, counseling services, and drop-out prevention programs.4'
Because of funding inequalities, poor and minority students get "the fewest
experienced and well-educated teachers, the least rigorous curriculum, and the
lowest quality facilities."42 These students are less likely to meet basic academic
standards and less likely to graduate from high school than their wealthier white
peers.43 Blacks and Latinos comprise 80% of the student population in extreme-
poverty schools44 and 63% of the student population in high-poverty schools.4 5 As
a result, the achievement gaps between white and minority students, as well as low
and average income students, have persisted in recent years.46 Decades after Brown
I, "the quality and quantity of education that children receive remain tied to the race
and economic status of their family.
4 7
37. Rebell, supra note 9, at 1500.
38. Lewin & Herszenhorn, supra note 7.
39. Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., The Blight that s Still with Us, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at A21
(internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 490 (Ark. 2002).
41. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989) (noting the
impact that increased spending has on such school characteristics in wealthy school districts in Texas).
42. THE EDUC. TRUST, supra note 26.
43. Rebell, supra note 9, at 1473-74; Robinson, supra note 1, at 1657.
44. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., WHY
SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 22 tbl.10 (2005), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.UCLA.edu/research/deseg/Why Segreg Matters.pdf Extreme poverty
schools are those in which 90%- 100% of the student population is considered poor.
45. See id. at 21 tbl.9. High poverty schools are those in which 501o-100% of the students are
considered poor.
46. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 2007, at 39, 144 tbl.14-1 (2007), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007064.pdf
(finding little to no change in math and reading achievement gaps between 1992 and 2005 among white,
black, and Hispanic students); Richard Rothstein & Tamara Wilder, Beyond Educational Attainment:
A MultifacetedApproach to Examining Economic Inequalities, in THE PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION 21, 23 24 (Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin
eds., 2007) (noting the persisting gaps in reading, math, and social studies achievement levels between
black and white students); Ross Weiner, Opportunity Gaps: The Injustice Underneath Achievement
Gaps in Our Public Schools, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1315, 1317 (2007) (citation omitted) (noting a study that
found that less than 50% of low income fourth graders had demonstrated basic reading and math skills,
while over 75% of their nonpoor peers had surpassed such levels).
47. Chambers, supra note 1, at 55.
[Vol. 59: 755
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The costs of inadequate education are clear.48 As the Supreme Court has stated,
"[t]he inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic
education each and every day of his life."49 For example, a high school dropout will
earn about $260,000 less during his lifetime and live 9.2 fewer years than a high
school graduate."0 The failure to provide all students with an adequate education
also has a high public cost: the government spends significantly more in terms of
social services on those who have received a poor education.5 Health-related losses
for high school dropouts amount to $58 billion a year, and annual tax losses exceed
$50 billion.52 Furthermore, a 1% increase in high school graduation rates could
reduce annual crime costs by $1.4 billion per year. 3 One state has even projected
its future need for prison beds based on local student illiteracy rates.5 4 In summary,
the failure to provide every student with a meaningful opportunity to learn
undermines America's civic competence and competitiveness in the global
55economy.
To address these consequences, advocates of equal educational opportunity
have fought in classrooms, state legislatures, and courthouses across the country for
successful schools with sufficient resources.5 6 These advocates generally seek to
transform convoluted, unpredictable, and politically-motivated school funding
schemes into systems that provide resources based on the actual cost of educating
each student 7.5 As noted above, some advocates have proposed suing in federal
court to vindicate the right to a quality education. 8 Yet, the fight for equality in
school funding has largely been waged in state courts and legislatures.59
48. Such costs include lower earnings, which result in significant losses in federal and state
income taxes; increased criminal activity, drug use, teenage pregnancy rates, and use of public
assistance; as well as poorer health. HENRY M. LEVIN, COLUMBIA UNIV., TEACHERS COLL., THE SOCIAL
COSTS OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION 16 17 (2005), available at http://www.tc.columbia.edu/i/a/
3082_socialcostsofinadequateEducation.pdf.
49. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982).
50. LEVIN, supra note 48, at 2.
51. See SWANSON & KING, supra note 22, at 18.
52. See LEVIN, supra note 48, at 2.
53. Id.
54. Andrew Block & Virginia Weisz, Choosing Prisoners over Pupils, WASH. POST, July 6,2004,
at A19.
55. Rebell, supra note 9, at 1475; see also Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d
326, 330 (N.Y. 2003) (acknowledging that a sound basic education includes "the basic literacy,
calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function productively as civic
participants capable of voting and serving on ajury" (quoting Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
56. See National Access Network, Access Quality Education: Advocacy Overview,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/advocacy/overview.php3 (last visited May 18, 2008).
57. See SCHRAG, supra note 13, at 5 7.
58. See sources cited supra note 1.
59. See National Access Network, Access Quality Education: School Funding Litigation
Overview, http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/overview.php3 (last visited May 18, 2008).
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B. Fighting for Education in the Courts
The legal fight for quality education is not new. Reformers have fought
vigorously for decades in federal and state courts to ensure that all students have the
opportunity to receive a meaningful education.60
1. Brown I and the Legal Basis for a Right to Education
In Brown ,61 the Supreme Court unanimously struck down racial segregation
in public schools.62 The Court declared that education, "where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms."6 Brown I became the foundation for guaranteeing every student an
opportunity to receive an education without regard to gender,64 immigrant status,65
or ability to speak English.66 In a landmark decision exempting the Amish from
compulsory education laws after completion of the eighth grade,67 the Supreme
Court emphasized "that some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens
to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to
preserve freedom. '6' Taken together, these decisions formed the beginning of a
recognizable right to an education.
2. Courts Begin to Consider School Funding
In 1969 and 1970, the Supreme Court affirmed two decisions that refused to
strike down school funding systems challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment.69
In both cases, the lower courts had identified a lack of judicially manageable
standards for remedying funding disparities and had endorsed deference to the state
legislature in making such alleged policy decisions.70
60. Id.
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. Id. at 493-95 (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 493. Brown I, of course, was not the first Supreme Court case to protect education from
government discrimination or intrusion. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 35
(1925) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)) (protecting parents' right to send their children
to private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down a ban on teaching
languages other than English in schools).
64. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,534 (1996) (invalidating the exclusion of women from
the Virginia Military Institute).
65. Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,223-24 (1982) (invalidating a state ban on education for children
of illegal immigrants).
66. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 69 (1974) (requiring appropriate education for children
regardless of English language skills).
67. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972).
68. Id. at 221.
69. See Burruss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970) (per curiam), aff'g 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va.
1969); Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (per curiam), affg Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp.
327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
70. See Burruss, 310 F. Supp at 574 ("[T]he courts have neither the knowledge, nor the means,
nor the power to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of these students throughout the
State."); Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. at 336 ("Even ifthere were some guidelines available to the
judiciary, the courts simply cannot provide the empirical research and consultation necessary for
educational planning." (citation omitted)).
[Vol. 59: 755
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Yet within a few years, the California Supreme Court7 and a federal judge in
Minnesota7 2 struck down educational funding systems in their respective states
because of the resulting disparities." Key scholarly publications at that time argued
that school funding schemes that discriminated between students living in wealthy
and poor districts based on "arbitrary geographical lines" were unconstitutional.74
A 1972 estimate indicated that school districts invested between 15% and 20%
more on the average white student's education than on that of a black student.
This split between legal scholars and the courts over appropriate funding for
education led to the landmark Supreme Court case of San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.76
3. Rodriguez: Foreclosing a Federal Right to Education?
In its 1973 five-to-four ruling in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court declared that
the state of Texas was not required to ensure that poor and wealthy school districts
spend equal amounts on their students.7 The Court noted that the right to an
education was neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution and
distinguished it from other fundamental rights, such as the right to vote and the
right of free speech.7" The Court also cited the tradition of state and local control
over education as a principal reason for its deference to Texas officials.79 If Brown
I required education to be available to all on equal terms, then Rodriguez
announced the limitation that "the Equal Protection Clause does not require
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages" in school funding.8"
4. School Funding Litigation Shifts to the States
In the wake of Rodriguez, advocates flocked to state courts to challenge state
school funding systems."' Their challenges were supported by provisions in each
state constitution calling for a free, thorough, and efficient system of public
schools. s2 Until the late 1980s, state defendants won about two-thirds of the cases,
71. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 31.
72. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
73. Id. at 876 77; Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1244.
74. Philip B. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 583, 585-86 (1968). See generallyJOHN E. COONS ETAL.,
PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970) (assessing empirical data concerning school funding
and arguing that such wide disparities violate the Equal Protection Clause).
75. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 28 (1972).
76. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
77. Id. at 54 55 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 35-37.
79. Id. at 42-43 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
81. See National Access Network, supra note 59.
82. See Michael A. Rebell, Education Adequacy Litigation and the Quest for Equal Educational
Opportunity, STUD. IN JUD. REMEDIES & PUB. ENGAGEMENT, Nov. 1999, at 1, 3-4, 13. See the
Appendix for a list of state constitution education clauses and school funding cases.
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which had largely raised equal protection-"equity"-claims. 3 Equalized funding
was resisted by wealthier school districts fearing that, absent new funding streams,
their local funds would be redistributed to poorer districts under "Robin Hood"
plans.8 4 Since 1989, however, plaintiffs have won 74%, or 20 out of the 28 final
school funding decisions; these results have been in part due to a shift away from
equity-based arguments to claims emphasizing the right to an adequate
education "adequacy" claims.85
Adequacy suits have demanded that states meet their constitutional duties by
providing the basic resources necessary to ensure that each student has an
opportunity to meet state education standards. 6 Because many states require
students to pass important standardized tests to graduate but have failed to
determine the cost of preparing students for these exams, courts have been
sympathetic to demands to hold states accountable.87 State courts in New York, for
example, ordered school funding increases totaling $3 billion, in part, because New
York students must pass a laboratory-science exam to graduate, even though many
attend high schools with no functioning labs. 8 Similar suits have recently led to a
$755 mil lion increase in spending for schools in Kansas and a $1.25 billion increase
in educational investments in Arkansas. 89
111. A RETURN TO FEDERAL COURT?
A. Practical Reasons to Pursue a Federal Right to Education
Despite significant successes in state courts, some advocates and reformers
suggest pursuing a federal right to education. 9° Leading legal scholars Cass
Sunstein, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Goodwin Liu are among those who argue that
the federal government has a constitutional duty to guarantee every child an
education. 9' These scholars and others have identified four key reasons to consider
returning to federal court to pursue a federal right to education.
83. See National Access Network, supra note 59.
84. See Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, The Adequacy Lawsuit: A Critical Appraisal, in
SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra note 18, at 1, 5;
Kurtis D. Behn, Comment, Finding a Coherent Federal Education Policy Where Adequacy Litigation
andNo ChildLeft BehindMeet, 40 SUFFOLKU. L. Rv. 439, 454 (2007) (citation omitted). Robin Hood
plans are those that equalize spending by shifting money spent in wealthier districts to poorer districts.
85. See National Access Network, Education Adequacy Liability Decisions Since 1989,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/AdequacyDecisions07.pdf [hereinafter National Access
Network, Liability Decisions] (noting twenty plaintiff victories and eight state victories); National
Access Network, "Equity" and "Adequacy" School Funding Liability Court Decisions,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/equityandadequacytable.pdf [hereinafter National Access
Network, Equity and Adequacy Decisions] (noting twenty-eight plaintiff victories and eighteen state
victories). For a thorough review of school finance litigation, see Janet D. McDonald et al., School
Finance Litigation and Adequacy Studies, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 69 (2004).
86. SCHRAG, supra note 13, at 5-6.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Lewin & Herszenhorn, supra note 7.
89. Id.
90. See sources cited supra note 1.
91. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 99; Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 123; Liu, supra note 1, at 334.
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1. Greater Uniformity in Educational Standards and Funding
All citizens of a just society should have the same basic rights regardless of
where they live. 92 Children, in particular, should not be subjected to a substandard
education solely because of their residence, a matter over which they have no
control. Only a federally enforceable right can provide a basic national standard in
education93 and overcome funding disparities between states, disparities which
comprise the majority of educational inequities.94
Furthermore, the federal government is also in a better position to coordinate
interstate steps towards more uniform standards and equitable funding.9" It has "the
greatest ability to redistribute wealth" and "address substandard academic
performance of students nationwide.""6 Thus, the argument goes, educational
shortcomings across the country require a national response, not piecemeal and
protracted litigation in each of the fifty states.97
2. Growing Federal Participation in Education
The second reason for returning to federal courts to pursue a federal right to
education involves federal legislation regulating certain aspects of public education.
NCLB and related laws have sufficiently federalized education so that our national
government must accept a corollary responsibility to provide students and schools
with the resources necessary to meet heightened accountability requirements." For
these reasons, the Sixth Circuit recently revived a suit in which the plantiffs argued
that NCLB imposes financial obligations on states and school districts without
providing enough funding to cover the associated costs.99
States facing sanctions and negative publicity for not meeting achievement
targets under NCLB have strong incentives to preemptively lower their educational
standards.0 0 A "race to the bottom"'0 ' can best be avoided by holding the federal
92. Cf JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 66 (1971) (noting that rights should be equally
distributed).
93. See Behn, supra note 84, at 450-51 (noting that federal involvement is preferable because it
"create[s] apool of intellectual resources.... but impose [s] no binding obligations to develop uniform
success between states"); cf Robert B. Schwartz, Professor at Harvard Univ. Graduate Sch. of Educ.,
Standards, Tests and NCLB: What Might Come Next, at 12-16 (Nov. 13, 2006),
http://devweb.tc.columbia.edu/manager/symposium/Files/102_SchwartzSTANDARDS%20AND%
20EQUITY1.pdf (arguing that although the federal government should not create national standards,
national standards are preferable because of wide variations in state proficiency standards).
94. See Liu, supra note 1, at 332; Robinson, supra note 1, at 1672-73.
95. See Behn, supra note 84, at 453.
96. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1689.
97. See id. at 1734.
98. See Salerno, supra note 1, at 538-39.
99. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 256-57 (6th Cir.
2008); see also Rudalevige, supra note 19, at 250 52 (describing the widespread state dissatisfaction
with NCLB as an unfunded mandate).
100. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1679-81; James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child
Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 944 (2004): Behn, supra note 84, at 451.
101. Ryan, supra note 100.
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government accountable for a uniform educational baseline, impartial evaluation
of state education data, and oversight of states' progress.'12
3. Fulfilling Brown I's Unfinished Legacy
The third reason for returning to federal court to pursue a federal right to
education focuses on fulfilling the unfinished legacy of Brown I. Brown Ps
declaration that education be made available to all on equal terms is one of the
Supreme Court's most well-known pronouncements; yet fifty years later, its vision
of equal opportunity remains incomplete. For some, school integration was
inherently an indirect and ineffective means of ensuring every student received a
quality education.'0 3 For others, including realists and race theorists, desegregation
faced insurmountable barriers, including racial housing patterns, white flight, social
resistance, and racism. °4 Brown I's vision has also been limited by the Supreme
Court's own concerns about "race-conscious decision-making" in public
education,'0 5 most recently in the Parents Involved decision in 2007."06 Although
Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggested some potentially acceptable race-
conscious actions by educators, 10 7 the plurality opinion was adamant in its color-
blind insistence that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race."' 8
A race-neutral federal right to education sidesteps these limitations but still
provides valuable assurance that the national struggle for equal educational
opportunity is not over. Furthermore, increased resources, in contrast to racial
integration, directly ensures quality teaching, school facilities, and instructional
materials.'0 9 Although some scholars still believe that integration plays a key role
102. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 1715-22.
103. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown Reconceived An Alternative Scenario, in BROWN AT 50: THE
UNFINISHED LEGACY 59, 68 (Deborah L. Rhode & Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. eds., 2004); see also Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 477-80 (1976) (criticizing the integration-only focus of civil rights
lawyers as coming at the expense of education for the poorest black students).
104. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEILEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., BROWN
AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLiSSY's NIGHTMARE? 11-13 (2004), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/resegO4.brown5O.pdf (examining the resistance to the
mandates of Brown I in the plaintiff school districts); Philip T.K. Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of
Educational Choice: Can the Polemic of Legal Problems Be Overcome?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 4 n.22
(1993) (noting that such barriers to integration included "residential segregation ... and the outward
hostility of school officials, teachers, and students").
105. John W. Borkowski, The 2006 2007 Term of the United States Supreme Court and Its
Impact on Public Schools, 223 EDUC. L. REP. 481, 492 93 (2007).
106. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
107. Id. at 2792. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that
such race-conscious measures could include selecting school sites, drawing attendance boundaries,
allocating programs and resources, "recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion," and tracking
and reporting data).
108. Id. at 2768 (plurality opinion).
109. See JENCKS, supra note 75, at 93 (noting that increased education spending usually goes to
pay for higher salaries for teachers, "better facilities," and "newer textbooks," among other things); cf
Robinson, supra note 1, at 1720 (arguing that "[flederal financial assistance would serve as an incentive
for states to take action to guarantee the federal right" to education).
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in boosting academic achievement,"' a growing consensus views resources as the
critical tool for improving our nation's worst public schools."' Focusing on greater
funding also benefits parents tired of underresourced schools without engendering
as much opposition from those who are apprehensive about racial integration in
their own communities." 2 Finally, pursuing a race-neutral federal right to education
avoids the Court's exacting scrutiny with regard to race. In short, it is a right with
a greater capacity to make education available to all on equal terms.
4. Continuing to Help the Students Most in Need
The fourth reason for returning to federal court to pursue a federal right to
education emphasizes assisting the most disadvantaged students. Federal funding
is highly directed towards helping educate students with the greatest needs. For
example, funding provided by Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 targets school districts with high student poverty levels,"3 and funding
provided by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) helps educators
teach students with disabilities."4 A federal right to education would further
guarantee that students at a true disadvantage are provided resources commensurate
with their needs. As a policy matter, targeting greater educational resources to
schools with disadvantaged students will boost student performance irrespective of
race. 1 5 Fighting for an adequate education for every student also has political
advantages. A federal right to education avoids alienating the support of poor
Whites, exacerbating white racism, or merely benefiting minority elites because it
focuses on the opportunity for all children, not just children of a certain race or
class." 6 Such a right would promise Internet access to poor white students in the
rural Midwest, quality bilingual instruction to Hispanic immigrant children in the
Southwest, and fewer crowded classrooms to impoverished Blacks in urban East
Coast schools. A right to learn builds on a societal consensus that those most in
need deserve a chance at a quality education, without regard to the color of their
skin.
110. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 296-307 (1999)
(comparing educational and long-term benefits of racial integration to those achieved as a result of
increased funding, which merely accepts "ghetto schools" for poor minority students).
111. See Lewin & Herszenhorn, supra note 7 (noting several court decisions providing poor
schools with more money and resources).
112. See Jonathan D. Glater & Alan Finder, School Diversity Based on Income Segregates Some,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at A24 (noting the success ofprograms implemented in various major cities
that use integration plans based on class or socioeconomic standing of their students rather than race).
113. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(5) (2000).
114. Id. §§ 1400 1487.
115. Rebell, supra note 9, at 1481-82 (citing Kristen Harknett et al., Do Public Expenditures
Improve Child Outcomes in the U.S. ? A Comparison Across Fifty States 17 (Ctr. for Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 53, 2003), available at http://www.cpr-maxwell.syr.edu/cprwps/pdfTwp53.pdf)
(noting that several recent studies have concluded that "educational expenditures are correlated with
positive student outcomes").
116. Cf Richard D. Kahlenberg, Stay Classy, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 18,2006, at 13, 14 (discussing
the success of a North Carolina school district that based school assignments on parental income).
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B. Getting over Rodriguez and into Federal Court
Practical benefits aside, an immediate legal barrier confronts those who wish
to pursue a federal right to education. Rodriguez has been broadly viewed as
denying a right to an education under the Constitution." 7 Scholars characterize the
decision by the "abrupt halt it marked in federal judicial support of major
educational reform."'' 8 Federal appellate'"9 and district courts, 20 as well as state
courts,' 2 ' have almost uniformly construed Rodriguez as foreclosing a
constitutionally protected federal right to education. Despite these assumptions,
Rodriguez stands for a more nuanced proposition: the Court in Rodriguez "did not
decide that education is not a fundamental right, but that the facts of Rodriguez did
not violate that right."' 
22
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court explicitly distinguished the relative
differences in education spending in Rodriguez, which did not interfere with
fundamental rights, from a hypothetical inadequate system 23 that "fails to provide
each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the
117. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Turning Stones of Hope into Boulders of Resistance: The First
andLast Task of SocialJustice Curriculum, Scholarship, andPractice, 86 N.C. L. REv. 673,723 (2008)
(asserting that the Rodriguez Court "squarely held that education was not a fundamental right");
Rudalevige, supra note 19, at 243 ("[T]he Supreme Court held in 1973 that education was not a
fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution ... .
118. Rebell, supra note 82, at 1.
119. See, e.g., Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[P]ublic education is not a
fundamental right." (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)));
Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 338, 343 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he right to education is not
constitutionally protected.... (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35)); Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 429
(7th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he Court determined that the right to an education was not guaranteed, either
explicitly or implicitly, by the Constitution, and therefore could not constitute a fundamental right."
(citing Rodrigue:, 411 U.S. at 35-37)); Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535,543 (10th Cir. 1979) ("[W]e
must recognize that the Supreme Court has ruled there is no constitutional right to an education." (citing
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35)); Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022,
1026 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The Supreme Court in [Rodrigue:] taught us that education, although an
important interest, is not guaranteed by the Constitution." (citing Rodrigue:, 411 U.S. at 35)). But cf
Sch. Bd. v. La. State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 830 F.2d 563, 568 (5th Cir. 1987)
(recognizing that deprivation of minimally adequate education requires heightened scrutiny),
superseded by constitutional amendment, LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13, cl. B.
120. See, e.g., Manbeck v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 435 F. Supp. 2d 273, 276 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[I]t is well established, however, that there is no fundamental right to education.");
Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 957 (E.D. Ark. 2002) ("[I]t is firmly established that the right
to an education is not provided explicit or implicit protection under the Constitution and is not a
fundamental right or liberty." (citing Rodrigue:, 411 U.S. at 35)); Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of
Educ. Sch. Dist. 61, 78 F. Supp. 2d 812, 822 (C.D. Ill. 2000) ("[T]he right to an education [is] not
guaranteed, either explicitly or implicitly, by the Constitution, and therefore could not constitute a
fundamental right." (second alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 129 F.3d at 429) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
121. See, e.g., Citizens of Decatur for Equal Educ. v. Lyons Decatur Sch. Dist., 739 N.W.2d 742,
757 (Neb. 2007) ("The federal Constitution does not provide a fundamental right to education." (citing
Rodrigue:,411 U.S. at 35)): Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 830 (Minn. 2005) ("[T]he United States
Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution." (citing
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35)); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ill. 1999) ("[W]e note that
education is not a fundamental right protected by the federal constitution." (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 35)).
122. Preovolos, supra note 1, at 83.
123. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at36 37.
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enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political
process."' 24 The Court implied that some level of education is required when it
noted that the Constitution does not guarantee citizens "the most effective speech
or the most informed electoral choice.""' The Court conceded that there might be
"some identifiable quantum of education [that] is... constitutionally protected."'26
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions confirm that Rodriguez left open the
possibility that some level of education is a constitutionally protected fundamental
right. In Plyler v. Doe, 27 the Court struck down a Texas law that barred children of
illegal immigrants from attending public schools as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.'28 Concerned about the severe cost to the
nation resulting from a permanent underclass of illiterate youth,'29 the Court applied
a heightened scrutiny 3 ' that it developed further in the years following
Rodriguez.3' Although the Plyler Court stated education was not a right guaranteed
by the Constitution,'32 the Court did insist that neither was it "merely some
governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation."'33 Education, the Court confirmed, was unique because of its
importance to the basic institutions of our democracy and the lasting effect on
children who are deprived of schooling.'34
In the 1980s, the Court explicitly stated, "As Rodriguez and Plyler indicate, this
Court has not yet definitively settled ... whether a minimally adequate education
is a fundamental right . . . ."1" But, in dicta in another opinion, Justice Powell
affirmed that the Court's decision in Rodriguez left room for the recognition of"a
constitutional right to a minimal level of free public education."' 36 For thirty-five
years, the possibility of a right to an adequate education arguably has lain dormant
in Rodriguez, despite widespread perceptions to the contrary.
3 7
Furthermore, each reservation the Rodriguez Court provided about expressly
recognizing a right to education has dissipated since 1973. Political support is an
important factor in judicial recognition of any right because the judiciary relies on
Congress, the executive branch, and state and local officials to implement its
124. Id. at 38.
125. Id. at 36 (first and third emphases added).
126. Id.
127. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
128. Id. at 230.
129. Id. at 223-24.
130. Seeid at 216-18 &218 n.16.
131. See id. at 218 n.16 (citing Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976)).
132. Id. at 221.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986); cf Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S.
450, 469 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (focusing on the important role education
plays in society).
136. Certain Named & Unnamed Non-Citizen Children & Their Parents v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327,
1332 (Powell, Circuit Justice 1980) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973)).
137. See sources cited supra note I (noting various authorities arguing that the federal government
should recognize a federal right to education because Rodriguez did not recognize one).
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decisions. 3 ' While there has been historical opposition to federal involvement in
education, opposition faced by the Rodriguez Court in 1973, recent bipartisan
efforts at the federal level to improve the nation's public school systems
demonstrate current support for recognizing a federal right to education. 3 9 One of
the Court's primary concerns in Rodriguez was local control of public schools, 4 '
perhaps because even thirty-five years ago, federal involvement in education was
considered radical.' 4 ' Not until the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the threat of
Russian superiority did the federal government begin investing in public schools.'42
Even after the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 first offered
federal funding,'43 there was still widespread demand for local control of schools,
especially given the prickly issues of desegregation and religion in schools.'44 As
recently as the 1980s, President Reagan campaigned for the abolition of the Office
of Education, which was part of the former United States Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare.
14 5
Signifying a shift in policy, the enactment of NCLB in 2001 has been the most
significant federal intervention in education in United States history,'46 notably
receiving the broad support of a Republican-controlled Congress. 4 7 NCLB
proclaims that one of its chief goals is to provide for the right of every student to
138. See Robinson, supra note Lat 1732 33 (citations omitted) (implying that the Court is unable
to effect social change absent support from the legislative and executive branches). See generally
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)
(arguing that inherent structural limits onjudicial power inhibit the courts' ability to bring about social
change absent support from the elected branches).
139. See generally PATRICK J. McGUINN, No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY, 1965-2005 (2006) (contrasting historical opposition to federal
involvement in education with the growing modem consensus supporting it); Robert Gordon, The
Federalism Debate: Why the Idea of National Education Standards Is Crossing Party Lines, EDUC.
WK., Mar. 15, 2006, at 48 (noting that NCLB received the support of both conservative advocates and
"progressive" thinktanks).
140. Rodrigue, 411 U.S. at42 43.
141. See Stephen K. Bailey, The Office of Education and the Education Act of 1965, in THE
POLITICS OF EDUCATION AT THE LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS 357, 357 (Michael W. Kirst ed.,
1970) [hereinafter POLITICS OF EDUCATION] (describing the support of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 by important personnel in the U. S. Office of Education as a "major departure"
from traditional federal policy).
142. See James L. Sundquist, For the Young, Schools, in POLITICS OFEDUCATION, supra note 141,
at 326.
143. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301 7941 (2000).
144. See Bailey, supra note 141, at 361.
145. JOHN BRADEMAS, THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS ON CAPITOL
HILL 82 (1987).
146. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1679.
147. See Library of Congress, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 497, http://clerk.house.gov/
evs/2001/rol1497.xml (recording an overall vote of 381 "ayes" and 41 "noes" in the House of
Representatives, with 183 "ayes" and 33 "noes" from House Republicans, and 198 "ayes" and 6 "noes"
from House Democrats); United States Senate, Record Vote Number 371, http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote cfm.cfm?congress 107&session= &vote-00371
(recording an overall vote of 87 "yeas" and 10 "nays" in the Senate, with 44 "yeas" and 3 "nays" from
Senate Republicans, 43 "yeas" and 6 "nays" from Senate Democrats, and I "nay" from the only
Independent).
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an adequate education.'48 NCLB has also fueled bipartisan efforts at state and local
levels to hold the federal government responsible for providing the resources
necessary to meet the law's stricter accountability requirements.'49 In 2007, the
Supreme Court accepted an analogous call for educational accountability"' under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act'' (IDEA) a bipartisan-supported
federal statute governing special education. Thus, it is clear that today's Court has
less to fear from the elected branches in endorsing a federal right to education than
the Court in 1973.
The Court in Rodriguez was also concerned that if education was ruled a
fundamental right, the Court would have to rule that food, clothing, and housing
were also fundamental rights because they are indistinguishable from education in
terms of importance for participation in the political process. 5 2 Such apprehensions
were entirely justifiable at a time when education was administered and overseen
by the United States Department for Housing, Education, and Welfare. 153 Yet, after
the 1979 creation of an independent cabinet-level Department of Education,'54 the
Court reversed its course, noting that education is not "merely some governmental
'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation."' 155 Others
have noted that education is distinguishable from other government benefits
because it is the only institution for which the government compels attendance of
all of its citizens.
156
148. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. V 2005) ("The purpose of this subchapter is to ensure that all
children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at
a minimum, proficiency on challenging [s]tate academic achievement standards and state academic
assessments."); see also West & Peterson, supra note 84, at 16 ("NCLB gives statutory recognition to
the adequacy movement's argument that states have a duty to educate all students to proficiency.").
149. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 260 (6th Cir. 2008)
(finding standing in a suit alleging that federal funding is insufficient to cover the increased costs of
compliance with the accountability requirements of NCLB); MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA R. WOLFF,
CAMPAIGN FOR EDUC. EQUITY, OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS: APPLYING LESSONS FROM THE EDUCATION
ADEQUACY MOVEMENT TO REFORM THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 5 7 (2006), available at
http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource-center/OpportunityKnocks.pdf (discussing states' and local
school districts' frustration in meeting requirements imposed by NCLB without adequate federal
funding, and the various suits instituted to obtain adequate resources); Robinson, supra note 1, at 1740
("[I]nadequate funding to implement NCLB's extensive changes has been a common lament among
states." (citing David J. Hoff, Debate Grows on the Costs of School Law, EDUC. WK., Feb. 4, 2004, at
I)); Salerno, supra note 1, at 538 (noting that states are generally unable to fund education without
federal resources).
150. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994, 2006 07 (2007) (granting parents the
right to pursue special education claims under the IDEA because the statute entitles their children to a
free and appropriate education); see also Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005)
(noting that the IDEA gives states "the primary responsibility" for educating handicapped children but
also "imposes significant requirements" in discharging that responsibility (quoting Bd. of Educ. v.
Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
151. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000).
152. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
153. See Bailey, supra note 141, at 358 59.
154. MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, HISTORY AND EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKING 55 (1999).
155. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
156. See Cynthia Newsome, Pay Attention: A Survey and Analysis of the Legal Battle over the
Integration of Forced Television into the Public School Curriculum, RUTGERS L.J. 281, 288 (2002)
(noting that "the state is the only body which has the power to compel school attendance" and that "the
state has the power to compel attendance only for the purpose of education"). As of 2004, all states
required attendance for a duration ranging from eleven to fourteen years. THOMAS D. SNYDER ET AL.,
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In Rodriguez, the Court had also fretted over the lack of manageable standards
or alternative financing schemes that could remedy funding disparities between
school districts. 157 At the time, federally funded educational research was just
beginning with projects like the National Institute for Education and the National
Center for Education Statistics,18 and the United States Department of Education
did not yet exist. 5 9 Aside from the California Supreme Court's ruling in Serrano
v. Priest,6 ' federal courts had little precedent for crafting a remedy for inadequate
school funding.' 6'
The standards-based education reform movement that began in the early 1 980s
has provided two decades of measurable educational goals, which have been used
extensively in state school funding cases and which now offer viable solutions.'62
As a result, state courts have had clear guidelines in defining the contours of an
adequate education, including both inputs, such as school funding, and outputs,
such as test scores. 63 State litigation has helped produce numerous studies and state
revenue models to measure the costs of educational reforms and ensure their
implementation.'64 State lawsuits have thus yielded judicially manageable
standards 65 and illustrated that the process of fixing school funding inadequacies
can be shared by courts and legislatures.
In summary, modern advocates pursuing a federal right to education can
arguably overcome Rodriguez. A closer and more nuanced analysis suggests that
Rodriguez and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have preserved the possibility
of a federal right to an education. The Rodriguez Court's chief concerns, such as
local control'66 and a lack of tested remedies,'67 have diminished with over three
decades of growing federal involvement in education'68 and successful state school
funding litigation. 169 Although Rodriguez is still a barrier to advocates seeking entry
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2006, at 233 tbl.153 (2007),
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007017.pdf
157. Rodrigue, 411 U.S. at42 43.
158. See VINOVSKIS, supra note 154 (noting the formation of the National Center for Education
Statistics in 1965 and the National Institute of Education in 1972).
159. See id. (noting that the U.S. Department of Education was formed in 1979).
160. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
161. See, e.g., Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. 111. 1968) (expressing the concern
that courts cannot generate the necessary research for "intelligent educational planning").
162. See Rudalevige, supra note 19, at 244; Rebell, supra note 82, at 10 11.
163. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 40 (N.Y. 2003)
(examining the evidence of a "sound basic education," which included "'inputs' children
receive-teaching, facilities and instrumentalities of learning-and their resulting 'outputs,' such as test
results and graduation and dropout rates"); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,
212 13 (Ky. 1989) (summarizing seven components of adequate education and nine essential
characteristics of an efficient school system); MICHAELA. REBELL & JESSICAR. WOLFF, CAMPAIGNFOR
EDUC. EQUITY, LITIGATION AND EDUCATION REFORM: THE HISTORY AND PROMISE OF THE EDUCATION
ADEQUACY MOVEMENT 10 11 (2006), http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource center/adequacy-
history.pdf (summarizing various state court definitions of a "basic quality education").
164. See National Access Network, A Costing Out Primer, http://www.schoolfunding.info/
resource center/costingoutprimer.php3.
165. See Rebell, supra note 9, at 1526 29.
166. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 50 (1973).
167. See id at 42-43, 56.
168. See supra notes 142, 146-51 and accompanying text.
169. See discussion supra Part II.B.4.
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into the federal courts, it is not as impenetrable as many commentators and courts
have argued.
C. Articulating a Viable Modern Federal Right to Education
Education advocates can draw on the successes of state litigation, 7 ° but in
order to return successfully to federal court, they must have a jurisdictional hook.
Advocates' best ground for a federal right to an education may be found in the Due
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 '
First, although the Constitution is silent on education, the Court has found
many unenumerated fundamental rights over the years.'2 Furthermore, where the
Constitution is silent, the Court has relied on "notions of a constitutional plan.., to
make the Constitution a workable governing charter."' 73 Ensuring that all students
have access to a basic education can be viewed as both integral to the democratic
process because it promotes responsible citizenship and vital to the protection of
the rights of children who, because of their age, are unable to defend their own
interests at the ballot box.'74 Underscoring the importance of elementary and
secondary schooling in preparing students for work and citizenship, the Court
reiterated in 2003 that education plays "a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric
of society."1 7'
The Due Process Clause prohibits all states from "depriv[ing] any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' 76 At its core, the provision
imposes procedural duties on state actors, such as the duty to provide students with
a hearing prior to expulsion.' However, some Justices on the Court have argued
170. Id.
171. Proponents have suggested other constitutional hooks for a federal right to education, such
as the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Chambers, supra note 1, at 68 69 (citing Philip B. Kurland,
The Privileges or nImunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U. L. REV. 405,
420 (1972)), and the Citizenship Clause, see Liu, supra note 1, at 344-48. However, because those
clauses have seldom served as an accepted grounds for recognizing a substantive right similar to a
federal right to education, they are not addressed by this Article.
172. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (right to make decisions regarding care,
custody, and control of one's children); Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 278 (1990) (right to refuse unwanted medical treatment); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153(1973)
(right to choose to have an abortion as part of the right of privacy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
629 31 (1969) (citations omitted) (right to travel freely); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(citations omitted) (right to marry a person of one's choice); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-85 (1965) (citations omitted) (rightto use contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541
(1942) (citations omitted) (right ofprocreation); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 35 (1925)
(citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)) (parents' right to direct their children's "upbringing
and education").
173. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
174. Cf STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS
160 61 (1996) (discussing the view that courts should seek to secure rights necessary for the
functioning of the democratic process and protect those not involved in the democratic process).
175. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982)).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
177. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975) (citations omitted) (holding that a
state must provide students with fundamentally fair procedures before withdrawing the right to an
education on "grounds of misconduct").
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that the Clause also protects substantive rights, including "freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints."' 78
For education advocates, "[i]nvoluntary placement of students by the state in
a program not designed to provide the skills that the state has articulated as the
purpose of compulsory education could be viewed as a deprivation of liberty
without due process of law."'7 9 Aside from jury duty, education is the only
institution in which government requires attendance of all its citizens. 80 However,
unlike jury duty, education is required by every state for anywhere between eleven
and fourteen years.' 8 ' For those who cannot afford private school, there is no viable
alternative to public education, and in many districts, there is little or no
opportunity to choose a specific school.'82 In fact, almost 74% of students in the
United States have no choice as to the school they attend.'83
The mandatory school attendance policy imposed by the state requires "a
concomitant responsibility on the state's part to provide a meaningful return for the
time and effort exacted."' 8 4 Based on due process arguments in criminal law, the
Court has found that "the nature and duration of commitment" of an incarcerated
individual must "bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed.' '1 5 By analogy, the Court could recognize a due process
right to education to ensure that every student receives a meaningful education,
provided that every student attended school for a certain number of years.'86
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits states "deny[ing] to any person within
itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'187 At its essence, it mandates equal
treatment of individuals in similar circumstances.' 88 When state laws do not treat
similarly-situated individuals in a similar fashion, however, the Court generally
defers to legislatures, so long as the classification bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate public purpose. 8 9 But the Court treats suspect classifications, such as
race, or infringements of fundamental rights, such as speech, as "presumptively
invidious."' 90
178. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
179. Paul Weckstein, School Reform and Enforceable Rights to Quality Education, in LAW AND
SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 306, 345 (Jay P. Heubert
ed., 1999).
180. See Newsome, supra note 156.
181. See SNYDER ET AL., supra note 156.
182. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION, 2006, at 79 tbl.36-1
(2006), http://nces.ed.gov/programns/coe/2006/pdf/36 2006.pdf (noting that almost 74% of students
attended assignedpublic schools, while approximately 15% attended a chosen public school and nearly
11% attended a private school).
183. Id.
184. Preovolos, supra note 1, at 101.
185. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
186. See, Note, supra note 1, at 1342 ("[T]he restraint of compulsory education laws is
unreasonable [where] the restraint is not achieving its asserted purpose of educating students ... .
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
188. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 216 17.
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Although the Court refused to declare education a fundamental right in
Plyler,19 ' it did apply heightened scrutiny in analyzing the Texas law barring
children of illegal immigrants from attending public schools.'92 Although
intermediate scrutiny was an unformulated standard in 1973, "[s]ince Rodriguez,
[it] ... has become an accepted part of the equal protection doctrine.' 93 As a result,
the Supreme Court may scrutinize a deficient educational system more closely. Just
as the Plyler Court rejected permanently subjecting children of illegal immigrants
to a fate of illiteracy, 194 the current Court could now similarly conclude that
subjecting students in poor districts to a wholly inadequate education based on
"arbitrary geographical lines"'195 is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause. Thus, while both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
could provide the basis for a federal constitutional right to an education, reformers
must consider whether it is worth advocating for such a right in federal court.
IV. REASONS NOT TO PURSUE A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION
Advocates and reformers must acknowledge that there are significant
limitations in pursuing a federal right to education. The biggest risk of returning to
the federal courts is that the Supreme Court could explicitly deny a right to an
adequate education, fully closing the door Rodriguez left partially open.' 96
Advocates must be cautious, however, as an unfavorable decision in federal court
could lead to prolonged setbacks in pursuing the right successfully. 197
A. Withdrawal of the Federal Judiciary from Education
Pursuing a federal right to education poses a significant challenge, given that
federal courts have weakened constitutional protections in public schools in several
areas, including desegregation, school funding, free speech, and student privacy.' 98
In fact, the Supreme Court recently reiterated its view that students' constitutional
rights "are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings."' 99
191. Id. at 223.
192. Id. at 218 n.16 (citing Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976)).
193. See Peter S. Smith, Note, Addressing the Plight of nner-City Schools: The Federal Right to
Education After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 825, 852 (1997) (citing
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973)).
194. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223 25.
195. Kurland, supra note 74, at 586.
196. For a discussion of the door Rodriguez left partially open, see supra Part IlI.B.
197. Gay and lesbian advocates had to wait seventeen years for the Supreme Court to overturn
an earlierruling upholding state sodomy laws. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled
by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Also, Americans were forced to live under a "separate but
equal" regime for fifty-eight years. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown
v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
198. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 113; see also Rebell, supra note 9, at 1496 1500 (discussing
the Supreme Court's decreased efforts to enforce meaningful educational opportunities for poor and
minority children and a trend of resegregation in public schools).
199. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. C. 2618, 2622 (2007) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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As a result of the Court's decisions effectively decreasing federal involvement
in desegregation efforts,200 a nationwide cycle of resegregation has followed.2"' As
a result, the average student today, whether white, black, or Hispanic, attends a
school with a majority of students of similar race.' In 2007, ending its long foray
into desegregation, the Court concluded that race-conscious integration plans, like
those it once imposed on schools, are now off-limits,2 3 even in communities that
adopt them voluntarily, for benign purposes, and with broad public support.20 4
The Court has also narrowed students' free speech and privacy rights. It has
given school officials greater authority to curb student expression that involves
sexual innuendo,2 5 addresses teen pregnancy, or, as treated in its 2007 "Bong
Hits for Jesus" decision, celebrates illegal drug use. 207 Furthermore, the Court has
limited student privacy rights by permitting schools to search students without
meeting the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement,20 8 conduct random
drug testing of students who participate in extracurricular activities, 20 9 and use
corporal punishment without providing any due process protections.210
After chronicling these trends, constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky
concluded that the federal courts have begun a "deconstitutionalization of
education. ' ,21' A documented retreat in judicial policing of students' rights in our
nation's public schools makes it unlikely that those same federal courts would
breathe life into a dormant constitutional right to education.
B. Revival of Judicial Federalism and Deference in Education
A reinvigorated federalism supportive of state and local sovereignty 212 has
accompanied the withdrawal of federal courts from cases alleging constitutional
violations in public schools. The Court has invalidated federal commandeering of
200. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995) (limiting the acceptable methods of
remedial desegregation measures); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992) (authorizing the
discontinuance of judicial oversight of desegregation measures in school districts that had complied
with federal desegregation orders); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,244-46 (1991) (ordering that
federal courts end their desegregation orders once integration is achieved, even if a return to local
control results in subsequent resegregation); Robinson, supra note 1, at 1663 65 (documenting the
retreat of the Supreme Court from desegregation).
201. See generally ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 104, at 9-19 (documenting the resegregation of
American schools since the early 1990s).
202. Id. at 16 17 & 17 tbl.6.
203. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
204. Id. at 2800 02 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
205. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 86 (1986) (citations omitted).
206. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274-76 (1988).
207. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
208. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 42 (1985) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20
(1968)).
209. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002).
210. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977).
211. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating certain
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 as exceeding Congress's Section Five and
Commerce Clausepowers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,551-52 (1995) (invalidating a federal
statute banning firearms near schools on federalism grounds).
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the state legislative process, 213 conscription of state officers,214 and regulation of
areas traditionally left to the states. 25 Furthermore, the Court has strengthened and
reinforced its commitment to state sovereign immunity2l6 and has continued to defer
to state and local governments under the tenure of Chief Justice Roberts."'
While the Court has traditionally preferred to avoid judicial intrusion in the
area of education by deferring to local school officials,218 its recent decisions
highlight even higher levels of such deference. Federal efforts to limit gun use near
schools were invalidated because the Court deemed schooling a local matter,2' 9 a
decision which constrained Congress' previously expansive Commerce Clause
powers. The Court upheld state vouchers even where 96% of parents used them to
send their children to parochial schools. 22 ' And, perhaps of greatest relevance, the
Supreme Court has declined to hear appeals from state supreme court decisions
addressing school funding deficiencies in each of the last four decades, 22' most
recently in 2003.222
In its recent federalist era, the Court has, on occasion, invalidated state action
related to education but only to rectify overriding constitutional violations, such as
213. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-77 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)) (invalidating a provision of a federal law
imposing liability on states that fail to comply with certain federal waste disposal measures).
214. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating certain provisions of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required state law enforcement officials to conduct
background checks of purchases prior to the sale of firearms).
215. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (noting that remedies for gender violence should be
provided by the states).
216. See, e.g., Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 535-36 (2002) (affirming
the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision that the tolling provision of the federal supplemental
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000), is unconstitutional when applied to nonconsenting state
defendants); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (concluding that Congress's attempt
to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C.
§§ 621 634 (2000), was an unconstitutional exercise ofits Fourteenth Amendment Section Five power);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks the power to subject
nonconsenting states, in derogation of their inherent sovereign immunity, to suits for violations of
federal labor laws, even in state courts); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996) (holding that
Congress lacked the power under the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10, to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity to suit).
217. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct.
1786, 1790 (2007) (citing C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)) (upholding a state
ordinance, challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause, that required haulers to bring waste to
state-owned facilities because waste collection is a traditional state function and the ordinance treated
in-state and out-of-state private businesses equally).
218. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977)); Brinkman, 433 U.S. at 410 (citations omitted); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 318 n.7 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 237 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
219. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 68 (1995).
220. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 647 48, 653 (2002).
221. See Sch. Bd. v. La. State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 830 F.2d 563, 573-74 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1223 (1988), superseded by constitutional amendment, LA. CONST.
art. VIII, § 13, cl. B; Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. Kansas, 885 P.2d 1170, 1193 (Kan. 1994), cert.
deniedsub nom. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 244 v. Kansas, 515 U.S. 1144 (1995); Serrano v. Priest, 557
P.2d 929, 952-53 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
222. State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 202-03 (Ohio 2003), cert. denied sub non].
DeRolph v. Ohio, 542 U.S. 966 (2003).
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gender discrimination in single-sex institutions.223 Even then, the Court faced a
scathing dissent from Justice Scalia, which emphasized the Constitution's silence
with respect to education and criticized the Court for imposing its policy view on
all fifty states."' Given the Court's recent increased recognition of state
sovereignty, it is unlikely that the federal judiciary would now allow preemption
in the area of school funding litigation, as education has long been considered the
province of state and local governments.
C. Rise of a Conservative Roberts Court
Changes in the composition of the Court also make it unlikely that the Court
would accept a "new" right not explicitly grounded in the text of the Constitution.
The recent appointments of alleged "strict constructionists," such as Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, raise doubts that the Court would be receptive to a
previously unarticulated federal right to education.225 Similar changes, after all, led
a five-to-four Court to uphold school funding disparities in Rodriguez.22 6 Justices
Warren, Fortas, Black, and Harlan all retired between 1969 and 1971 and were
replaced by four Nixon appointees, Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist, making the Court more "conservative" by 1973.22 That change marked
a new era of federalism that encouraged judicial restraint and relied on states "to
secure rights unavailable under the U.S. Constitution. 228
A parallel development exists today. 229 A majority of the Roberts Court likely
shares the view of its 1970s counterpart that "the Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. ' 2 0 The late Chief Justice
Rehnquist, for example, cautioned the Court against acting as "a small group of
fortunately situated people with a roving commission" to address societal
problems. 23' And Justice Scalia, the modern Court's most strident textualist, has
noted that absent an explicit protection, the Court must admit that the Constitution
"takes no sides in this educational debate." 23 2 Even if the current Court is not mired
in desegregation cases and dealing with the massive resistance the Rodriguez Court
223. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
224. Id. at 566 67 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. See Carl F. Kaestle, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Federal Government: A
Response to Goodwin Liu, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 152, 155 (2006), http://yalelawjoumal.org/
images/pdfs/78.pdf ("[G]iven the present predilections of the Court, a reversal of Rodriguez seems
unlikely on any grounds in the near future ....").
226. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation ofAmerican Public Education:
The Courts' Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1620-21 (2003); cf SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 153-54
(discussing the correlation between President Nixon's election, subsequent Supreme Court
appointments, and the Court's decisions affecting social and economic rights in the 1970s).
227. See BRUCE E. FEIN, SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT: 1972 73 TERM, at 1
(1974).
228. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 161 (1998) (footnote omitted).
229. See Chemerinsky, supra note 226, at 1620 21.
230. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
231. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion ofa Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693,698 (1976).
232. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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faced in 1973,233 it still may be averse to becoming involved in another thorny
education issue.
The Supreme Court's reluctance to umpire education debates has surfaced
several times in the last few years. In 2004, the Court sidestepped the merits of a
challenge to classroom recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance as a violation of the
First Amendment by deciding the case on procedural grounds instead.234 In 2007,
the Court's decision in Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of
Education2 35 illustrated its reluctance to enter into the technical arena of school
finance. In Zuni, the Court upheld New Mexico's statewide redistribution of federal
funds intended to offset a diminished local taxing capacity resulting from the
presence of untaxed federal lands. 236 The Court deferred to the United States
Department of Education's analysis of state school funding efforts,23 even though
the Department's method seemingly contravened the statute's plain language.
23
The Court ruled as it did, in part, to avoid disrupting the longstanding funding
practices of school districts nationwide.239
Although Zuni is of limited application,24 ° the decision suggests that the Court
is generally reluctant to upset local decisions of school districts regarding the
allocation of scarce educational resources. As a result of Zuni, there has been
limited federal agency review of the distribution of federal funds to New Mexico
public schools relative to ongoing state legislative review of school funding
standards. 241 Greater progress through state governments suggests another reason
not to pursue a federal right to education in federal court.
D. Success of State School Funding Litigation
As a counterpoint to the risks of returning to federal court, there are benefits of
continuing to litigate school funding cases at the state level. State constitutions,
unlike the federal Constitution, explicitly recognize the right to an education.242 As
233. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
258 (1979) (noting the slim majority ruling in Rodriguez and the hesitancy of the Court to become
involved in education cases because of the possibility of an onslaught of litigation).
234. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4 5 (2004).
235. 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007).
236. Id. at 1537-38.
237. Id. at 1541.
238. Id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 1541 (majority opinion).
240. See Borkowski, supra note 105, at 508 (noting that the Court's decision only affects school
districts receiving aid under one particular program).
241. See Susie Gran, Court RulesAgainst SchoolDistricts, ALBUQUERQUE TIMES, Apr. 17,2007,
at Al.
242. See In re Conklin, 946 F.2d 306, 323 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that many state high courts
found school funding schemes to violate their state constitutions but not the U.S. Constitution, in part
because the state constitutions provided more expansive educational rights); Michael D. Blanchard, The
New Judicial Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Disclosure and the Tyranny of the Locality in
State Judicial Review of Educational Finance, 60 U. PITT. L. REv. 231,232 (1998) (noting that the right
to education is "expressly enumerated" in all state constitutions). For a list of state constitution
education clauses and related school funding litigation, see Appendix.
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a result, courts have been more willing to hold states accountable in providing the
resources necessary to meet state-imposed educational standards.243
State litigation, by most accounts, has been relatively successful, with plaintiff
victories in twenty-eight states. 44 Elected officials, following state court orders,
have increased spending by 11% on schools in the poorest districts and by 7% in
median districts.z45 Increased funding for the neediest districts has increased student
proficiency in states such as Kentucky and Massachusetts and improved school
facilities in others, such as Arizona.2 46 Furthermore, studies prompted by litigation
in more than thirty states have resulted in revisions to school funding formulas so
that educational resources are delivered based on actual student need.247
At the remedial stage, state-generated solutions also make it easier to tailor
reforms to various educational shortcomings and local political realities than would
be possible at the national level.248 Correcting sharp divides between New York
City schools and its suburban counterparts, for example, raises very different
challenges than does fixing the educational inadequacies facing rural communities
in sparsely populated Alaska.
2 49
Furthermore, judicial activism at the state level is viewed as more tolerable
because state judges, often elected, are accountable to state residents, and the
citizens of the states can more easily amend their state constitutions in response to
judicial decisions they believe are faulty.2 5 As a result, decisions of state courts
tend to enjoy more legitimacy and are more likely to reflect community concerns
than those of life-tenured federal judges often perceived as distant.
In the last three decades, state-level litigation has made important contributions
in the field of school funding. Such litigation has documented the failures of
unnecessarily complex state funding formulas that distribute resources based on
243. See SCHRAG, supra note 13, at 5-7.
244. See National Access Network, Equity and Adequacy Decisions, supra note 85; Rebell, supra
note 9, at 1500 01 (noting that challenges to school funding systems have been brought in more than
forty states and plaintiffs have won major decisions in more than 60% of them, and in particular, more
than 75% of adequacy decisions); Deborah A. Verstegen, Towards a Theory of Adequacy: The
Continuing Saga of Equal Educational Opportunity in the Context of State Constitutional Challenges
to SchoolFinance Systems, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 499, 508 12 (2004) (highlighting the success
of adequacy litigation in various states).
245. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1670.
246. Rebell, supra note 9, at 1527 (citations omitted).
247. Id. at 1528.
248. See SCHRAG, supra note 13, at 232 33.
249. See Paul L. Tractenberg, Refusal to "Federalize" the Quest for Equal Educational
Opportunity, the Role of State Courts and the Impact of Different State Constitutional Theories: A Tale
of Two States, Paper Prepared for the CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY &
DIVERSITY, RETHINKING RODRIGUEZ: EDUCATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT (2006),
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/ewi-old/research/kl 2equity/tranctenbergjpaper.pdf (comparing
school funding developments in California and New Jersey). Compare Joe Williams, The Non-
Implementation ofNew York's Adequacy Judgment, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT
OFEDUCATIONALADEQUACY, supra note 18, at 195, 197 208 (discussing the challenges and difficulties
of determining and providing educational adequacy for New York's urban schools as compared to its
suburban schools), with Chris Lott, Note, The Methodological Middle Ground: Finding an Adequacy
Standard in Alaska's Education Clause, 24 ALASKAL. REV. 73, 80 103 (2007) (discussing the history
of adequacy litigation in Alaska and various arguments for determining and providing educational
adequacy in Alaska public schools).
250. See Blanchard, supra note 242, at 260 61.
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political motivations rather than student need.25' State litigation has spurred the
development of innovative legal strategies, such as the shift from equity to
adequacy, as well as the development of basic school funding principles, including
transparency, predictability, and accountability. 2 2 By coupling accountability and
adequacy, state lawsuits have united liberals and conservatives, and "linked higher
standards ... to increased resources. '253 In addition, state litigation has produced
judicially manageable standards,254 and has brought courts and legislatures together
in fixing school funding inadequacies. 255 State litigation is not a perfect solution to
educational inadequacies,256 but it has been an effective tool that is preferable to the
uncertainties of seeking redress in federal court.
E. Local Control over Education
Local control over education remains a reality and a touchstone of accountable
government that weighs against a federal right to education. Federal participation
in education has increased in recent years,257 but decisions regarding curriculum,
personnel, and school administration are overwhelmingly made at the community
level.2"' The American tradition of decentralized education is viewed as "more
responsive... [and] democratic" than an educational system controlled by a distant
federal government.259 A policy of al lowing wide-ranging local reforms encourages
states, as individual laboratories, to work toward educational success.
260
State and local governments also provide funding for over 90% of public
school expenditures. 261 Brown I's famous proclamation that "education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments , 262 still reflects modern
251. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 347 48 (N.Y. 2003)
(describing New York's school funding formula as "needlessly complex, malleable and not designed
to align funding with need").
252. See id. at 345.
253. SCHRAG, supra note 13, at 13.
254. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (outlining
seven components of educational adequacy).
255. See Rebell, supra note 9, at 1526 29 (noting the response of several state legislatures to court
decisions and court involvement in school funding issues).
256. For several critiques of state school funding litigation, see Eric A. Hanushek, When School
Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 425, 433-39 (1991) (arguing
that additional resources for education gained from successful state litigation do not improve
educational outcomes); Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV.
2417, 2446-50 (2004) (condemning judicial involvement in educational decisionmaking because of
courts' inability to effect social change); Kenneth W. Starr, The Uncertain Future of Adequacy
Remedies, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra note
18, at 307, 313 14 (criticizing judicial activism in state school funding decisions and recognizing the
tradition of local control of public schools).
257. See supra notes 146-51, 154, 158-61 and accompanying text.
258. Cf Starr, supra note 256, at 314 (noting that courts, as opposed to local legislatures, lack the
resources necessary to effectively implement any system it designs to ensure adequate education).
259. See Kaestle, supra note 225, at 152.
260. See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined.
The Emerging Model of School Governance andLegalReform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183,
184 (2003).
261. See NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 21, at 4 fig. I; Robinson, supra note
1, at 1744 (noting that federal funding accounts for only 7%-10% of education funding).
262. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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practice. Even if NCLB has imposed federal requirements in the area of education,
no single expenditure receives more state and local support than public schools.263
There is a certain logic in having state litigation alleging resource deficiencies track
state expenditures, the primary source of funding for education. Despite growing
"federal involvement in education, the tradition of local-state governance has
prevailed over efforts to equalize education resources across state lines through
litigation or legislation." '264
The Supreme Court has been a chief defender of local control. The year
following Rodriguez, the Court declared that "[n]o single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools. '265
Ever since, the Court has reiterated the value of local control in decisions involving
school desegregation,26 6 education funding, 267 student assignment, 268 and student
speech.269 The Court has praised local control because it "affords citizens an
opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school
programs to fit local needs, and encourages 'experimentation, innovation, and a
healthy competition for educational excellence. "27' The prominence of community
decisionmaking in schooling and the Supreme Court's commitment to this policy
weigh heavily against pursuit of a federal right to education.
V. CONCLUSION
A federal right to an education remains legally possible today, despite general
perceptions that Rodriguez foreclosed such a right. By some measures, renewed
federal litigation is the most viable it has been since Rodriguez was decided. In
1973, advocates and politicians were divided over federal involvement in
education, legal precedent for a right to education was tenuous at best, and few
remedies for school funding inadequacies were available. Thirty-five years later,
263. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
264. Kaestle, supra note 225, at 153.
265. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
266. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2826 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has long acknowledged that local school boards are in the
best position to determine how to meet their students' needs); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 505
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (stating that federal supervision of local schools was
intended to be only temporary in duration); Bd. ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (citations
omitted) (recognizing that federal supervision of school should last only as long as needed to remedy
past discrimination); Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-42 (noting the importance of local control of schools
because of the opportunity for community involvement and the ability to adapt to the particular needs
of the students).
267. See Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 635 (1985) (acknowledging the importance of
local control ofeducation in the context of funding for low income areas); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,49-51 (1973) (citations omitted) (noting the need for local control in policies
designed to remedy interdistrict funding disparities).
268. See Martinez ex rel. Morales v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321,329 30 (1983) (quoting Milliken, 418
U.S. at 741-42) (upholding a local residence requirement based on the strong tradition of local control
over public schools); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 481-82 (1982) (quoting
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741 42) (upholding a school district's student assignment policy based on notions
of local control).
269. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240-41 (1990) (citations
omitted); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968) (citations omitted).
270. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741 42 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50).
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elected officials largely support federal participation in education, numerous state
decisions advance a right to education, and manageable standards for school
funding reform abound. Growing frustration with a national regime that demands
accountability without providing adequate resources also makes a federal right to
education more politically feasible.
Though a federal right to education may be found in the Constitution,
advocates should not return to the federal courts to try and achieve a quick fix to
the country's school funding problems. Recent Supreme Court decisions, such as
ones that limit options for school integration,27' suggest a federal right to education
will not be a welcome next step toward providing every student with a meaningful
chance to learn. Reflecting on three decades of successful state school funding
litigation and the federal judiciary's recent reluctance to become involved in
education, reformers should continue to use state courts to ensure that local
community leaders provide the resources students need. The lure of avoiding
piecemeal litigation should not distract advocates from what has been a successful
state-level effort by courts, legislatures, and concerned citizens to improve the
funding and management of our public schools.
271. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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APPENDIX: STATE CONSTITUTION EDUCATION CLAUSES AND SCHOOL FINANCE
LITIGATION
State Constitution Litigation
Exparte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002)
(per curiam)
Alabama Art. XIV, § 256 Exparte James, 713 So. 2d 869 (Ala. 1997)
Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107
(Ala. 1993)
Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756
(Alaska Super. Ct. June 21, 2007), available at
http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/ak/
Alaska Art. VI1, § I Moore trialcourt 6-07.pdf
Kasayulie v. State, No. 3AN-97-3782
(Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1999)
Matanuska-Sustina Borough Sch. Dist. v. State,
931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997)
Crane Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State,
CV 2001-016305 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2006),
available at http://www.nsba.org/cosa2/clips/docs/
craneelemctofappeals.pdf
Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. State,
74 P.3d 258 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)
Arizona Art. XI, § I Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc)
Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (Ariz. 1997)
(en banc)
Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop,
877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc)
Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973)
(en banc)
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee,
370 Ark. 139 (Ark. 2007)
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee,
220 S.W.3d 645 (Ark. 2005)
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee,
Arkansas Art. XIV, § 1 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002)
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee,
10 S.W.3d 892 (Ark. 2000)
Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25,
917 S.W.2d 530 (Ark. 1996)
Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90
(Ark. 1983)
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State Constitution Litigation
County of Sonoma v. Comm'n on State Mandates,
101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784 (Ct. App. 2000)
California Art. IX, § 5 Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Ct. App. 1986)
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (in bank)
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (in bank)
Lobato v. State, No. 06CA0733, 2008 WL 194019
Colorado Art. IX, § 2 (Col. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008)
Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005
(Colo. 1982) (en banc)
Carroll-Hall v. Rell, No. X09CV054019406,
2007 WL 2938295 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2007)
Connecticut Art. VIII, § 1 (unpublished opinion)
Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996)
Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 1985)
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977)
Delaware Art. X, § 1 No litigation
Florida Art. IX, § 1 Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc.
v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam)
Complaint, Consortium for Adequate Sch. Funding
v. State, No. 2004-CV-91004
Georgia Art. ViII, § I (Ga. Super. Ct. Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.casfg.org/litigation/Ga School Finance
Complaint.pdf
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981)
Hawaii Art X, § I No litigation
State v. Dist. Court of Fourth Judicial Dist.,
152 P.3d 566 (Idaho 2007)
Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State,
129 P.3d 1199 (Idaho 2005)
Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State,
97 P.3d 453 (Idaho 2004)
Idaho Art. IX, § I Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State,
976 P.2d 913 (Idaho 1998)
Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State
Bd. ofEduc. ex rel Mossman, 912 P.2d 644
(Idaho 1996)
Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans,
850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993)
Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975)
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State Constitution Litigation
Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (111. 1999)
Illinois Art. X, § I Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178
(Ill. 1996)
Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 885 N.E.2d 673
Indiana Art. VIII, § 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)Lake Cent. v. State, No. 56 C01-8704-CP81
(Ind. Cir. Ct. 1987)
Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787
Iowa Art. IX, 2d, § 3 (Iowa 1994)
Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755 (Kan. 2006)
(per curiam)
Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005)
Kansas Art. V1, § 1 (per curiam) (supp. opinion)
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170
(Kan. 1994)
Knowles v. State Bd. of Educ., 547 P.2d 699
(Kan. 1976)
Young v. Williams, No. 03-00055/01152
(Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 2007)
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.,
Kentucky §183 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989)
Miller v. Nunnelley, 468 S.W.2d 298
(Ky. Ct. App. 1971)
Jones v. State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ.,
927 So. 2d 426 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
Charlet v. Legislature, 713 So. 2d 1199
Louisiana Art. VIII, § 1 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
La. Ass'n of Educators v. Edwards, 521 So. 2d 390
(La. 1988)
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. I v. Comm'r, Dep't of Educ.,
Maine Art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1 659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995)
Md. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bradford, 875 A.2d 703
Maryland Art. VIII, § 1 (Md. 2005)
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ.,
458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983)
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State Constitution Litigation
Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134
Massachusetts Pt. 2, ch. V, § II (Mass. 2005)
McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ.,
615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993)
Durant v. State, 650 N.W.2d 380
(Mich. Ct. App. 2002)
Durant v. State, 566 N.W.2d. 272 (Mich. 1997)
Michigan Art. VIII, § 2 (per curiam)
E. Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam)
Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973)
Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972)
Minnesota Art. XIII, § 1 Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993)
(en banc)
Mississippi Art. VIII, § 201 No litigation
Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 967 S.W.2d 62
Missouri Art. IX, § 1(a) (Mo. 1998) (en banc)
Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446
(Mo. 1994) (en banc)
Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State,
109 P.3d 257 (Mont. 2005)
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. I v. State,
784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990)
Montana Art. X, § 1(3) Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. I v. State,
769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), amended by 784 P.2d 412
(Mont. 1990)
State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776
(Mont. 1974)
Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v.
Nebraska None Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164 (Neb. 2007)
Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993)
(per curiam)
Nevada Art. X1, § 2 No litigation
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State Constitution Litigation
Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State,
907 A.2d 988 (N.H. 2006)
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 794 A.2d 744
(N.H. 2002)
New Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 744 A.2d 1107
Hampshire Pt. 2, ar. 83 (N.H. 1999)
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353
(N.H. 1997)
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375
(N.H. 1993)
Art. VIII, § IV,
para. 1
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 935 A.2d 1152
(N.J. 2007)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 2006 WL 1388958
(N.J. 2006)
Abbott ex rel Abbott v. Burke, 901 A.2d 299
(N.J. 2006)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 889 A.2d 1063
(N.J. 2005) (mem.)
Bd. of Educ. v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., 872 A.2d 1052
(N.J. 2005)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 862 A.2d 538
(N.J. 2004)
Abbott v. Burke, 852 A.2d 185 (N.J. 2004) (mem.)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 832 A.2d 906
(N.J. 2003)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 832 A.2d 891
(N.J. 2003), amended by 862 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2004)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 798 A.2d 602
(N.J. 2002)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 790 A.2d 842
(N.J. 2002)
Stubaus v. Whitman, 770 A.2d 1222
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d 1032
(N.J. 2000) (per curiam)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82
(N.J. 2000)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450
(N.J. 1998)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417
(N.J. 1997)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575
(N.J. 1994) (per curiam)
Borough of Sea Bright v. State, 576 A.2d 331
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359
(N.J. 1990)
Abbott ex reL Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376
(N.J. 1985)
Robinson ex rel Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129
(N.J. 1976) (per curiam)
Robinson ex reL Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273
(N.J. 1973)
New Jersey
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State Constitution Litigation
Zuni Sch. Dist. v. State, No. CV-98-14-11
New Mexico Art. XII, § I (N.M. Dist. Ct. Oct. 14, 1999)
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006)
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003)
New York Art. Xl, § I Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995)
Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo,
655 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1995)
Bd. ofEduc. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982)
Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365
(N.C. 2004)
North Carolina Art. IX, § 2 Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997)
Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987)
Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. I v. State,
North Dakota Art. VIII, § 2 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994)
State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195
(Ohio 2003)
DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002)
Ohio Art. VI, § 2 DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001)
DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000)
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997)
Bd. ofEduc. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979)
Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. State, 158 P.3d 1058
Oklahoma Art. XIII, § 1 (Okla. 2007)
Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State,
746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987)
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